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作者:

Li GaiDi (Li GaiDi.) | Du DongLei (Du DongLei.) | Xu DaChuan (Xu DaChuan.) (学者:徐大川) | Zhang RuYao (Zhang RuYao.)

收录:

EI Scopus SCIE

摘要:

Multi-level economic lot-sizing models have been extensively investigated under different multi-level structure assumptions. In this paper, we consider the cooperative game associated with the multi-level economic lot-sizing problem. We present a cost-sharing method for the multi-level economic lot-sizing game, under a mild condition, which is cross-monotonic, competitive, and approximate cost recovery.

关键词:

cross-monotonic multi-level economic lot-sizing game competitive approximate cost recovery

作者机构:

  • [ 1 ] [Li GaiDi]Beijing Univ Technol, Dept Appl Math, Beijing 100124, Peoples R China
  • [ 2 ] [Xu DaChuan]Beijing Univ Technol, Dept Appl Math, Beijing 100124, Peoples R China
  • [ 3 ] [Du DongLei]Univ New Brunswick, Fac Business Adm, Fredericton, NB E3B 5A3, Canada
  • [ 4 ] [Zhang RuYao]Fudan Univ, Sch Math Sci, Shanghai 200433, Peoples R China

通讯作者信息:

  • 徐大川

    [Xu DaChuan]Beijing Univ Technol, Dept Appl Math, Beijing 100124, Peoples R China

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来源 :

SCIENCE CHINA-INFORMATION SCIENCES

ISSN: 1674-733X

年份: 2014

期: 1

卷: 57

8 . 8 0 0

JCR@2022

ESI学科: COMPUTER SCIENCE;

ESI高被引阀值:188

JCR分区:3

中科院分区:4

被引次数:

WoS核心集被引频次: 2

SCOPUS被引频次: 7

ESI高被引论文在榜: 0 展开所有

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