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作者:

Cai Yongquan (Cai Yongquan.) (学者:蔡永泉) | Peng Xiaoyu (Peng Xiaoyu.)

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摘要:

To solve the question that players will deviate from secret sharing protocol for their own benefits, we apply game theory to the protocol. It is the first time to use the model of dynamic game of incomplete information, by controlling the probability parameter, the designated strategies will be a computational perfect k-resilient Nash equilibrium. Using this protocol, to achieve fairness, we don't have to assume the number of malicious players is no more than half of the total number which is important in traditional protocols, our protocol can prevent deviating behaviors effectively to achieve extreme fairness.

关键词:

Dynamic game of incomplete information Fairness Game theory Secret sharing

作者机构:

  • [ 1 ] [Cai Yongquan]Beijing Univ Technol, Coll Comp Sci & Technol, Beijing 100124, Peoples R China
  • [ 2 ] [Peng Xiaoyu]Beijing Univ Technol, Coll Comp Sci & Technol, Beijing 100124, Peoples R China

通讯作者信息:

  • 蔡永泉

    [Cai Yongquan]Beijing Univ Technol, Coll Comp Sci & Technol, Beijing 100124, Peoples R China

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来源 :

CHINESE JOURNAL OF ELECTRONICS

ISSN: 1022-4653

年份: 2012

期: 1

卷: 21

页码: 149-152

1 . 2 0 0

JCR@2022

ESI学科: ENGINEERING;

ESI高被引阀值:138

JCR分区:4

中科院分区:4

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WoS核心集被引频次: 4

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ESI高被引论文在榜: 0 展开所有

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