This　paper　analyzes　an　attack-defense　game　between　one　defender　and　one　attacker.　Among,　the　defender　moves　first　and　allocates　its　resources　to　three　different　methods:　employing　a　preventive　strike,　founding　false　targets,　and　protecting　its　genuine　object.　The　preventive　strike　may　expose　the　genuine　object,　and　different　from　previous　literature,　a　false　target　may　also　be　detected　to　be　false.　The　attacker,　observing　the　actions　taken　by　the　defender　and　allocating　its　resources　to　three　methods:　protecting　its　own　base　from　the　preventive　strike,　founding　false　bases,　and　attacking　the　defender＇s　genuine　object.　Similarly,　a　false　base　may　be　correctly　identified.　Different　from　previous　methods　in　evaluating　the　potential　outcome,　for　each　of　the　defender＇s　given　strategies,　the　attacker　tries　to　maximize　its　cumulative　prospect　value　considering　different　possible　outcomes.　Similarly,　the　defender　maximizes　its　cumulative　prospect　value,　assuming　that　the　attacker　chooses　the　strategy　to　maximize　the　attacker＇s　cumulative　prospect　value.　Numerical　examples　are　presented　to　illustrate　the　optimal　number　of　bases　to　attack　by　preventive　strike,　and　the　optimal　number　of　targets　to　attack　by　attacker.