Focusing　on　the　selection　of　green　and　low　carbon　(GLC)　innovation,　this　paper　builds　an　evolutionary　game　between　manufacturing　enterprises,　and　another　model　between　an　enterprise　and　the　government.　Based　on　the　models,　the　dynamic　evolution　of　the　selection　process　was　analyzed　in　details.　The　results　show　that　the　game　between　manufacturing　enterprises　will　eventually　converge,　due　to　the　cost　advantage　of　some　enterprises　in　traditional　innovation　and　the　spillover　effect　of　GLC　innovation　results.　Some　enterprise　will　choose　GLC　innovation,　but　some　will　adhere　to　traditional　innovation,　while　sharing　part　of　the　revenue　of　GLC　innovation　of　others.　After　government　intervention,　the　innovation　behaviors　of　manufacturing　enterprises　will　be　compensated　for,　rewarded,　or　penalized　by　means　of　transfer　payment,　tax　credit,　etc.　As　a　result,　all　enterprises　will　eventually　switch　to　GLC　innovation.　©　2020　THE　AUTHORS