The　mixed　traffic　flow　has　an　increasingly　impact　on　the　operation　of　urban　traffic.　To　study　the　evolution　law　of　multi-group　behaviors　in　pedestrian　crossing,　we　used　the　evolutionary　game　theory　to　establish　a　multi-group　behavior　evolution　model　for　pedestrian　crossing.　The　process　of　concern　started　from　the　risk　perception　and　multi-group　behavior　choice.　The　evolutionary　stability　strategies,　evolution　trends,　and　factors　affecting　the　evolutionary　path　of　multi-group　behaviors　are　discussed　in　this　paper.　This　study　found　that　evolutionary　strategy　equilibrium　of　pedestrians,　drivers,　and　traffic　managers　not　only　relied　on　their　own　earning,　but　also　on　those　of　the　other　two　groups.　The　factors　affecting　its　behavior　included　the　revenue　factor　and　the　limiting　factor.　Evolutionary　game　theory　was　used　to　analyze　the　multi-group　interaction　behavior　of　pedestrians,　vehicle　drivers,　and　traffic　managers　in　the　process　of　pedestrian　crossing,　as　well　as　to　analyze　the　behavior　of　traffic　subjects　in　the　process　of　pedestrian　crossing.　This　paper　provides　a　basis　for　decision-making　for　the　traffic　management　department　to　manage　road　traffic,　offering　a　new　idea　from　the　perspective　of　evolution　for　solving　the　conflict　of　interest　at　the　crosswalk　of　the　road　section.