This　research　studies　the　system　defense　of　M　defenders　against　N　attackers.　We　model　this　problem　as　a　defense-attack　game　between　M　defenders　and　N　attackers　based　on　the　cumulative　prospect　theory.　In　this　game,　the　defenders　can　allocate　their　resources　to　defend　the　system　from　being　attacked,　and　to　attack　the　attackers　such　that　the　opponents　lose　their　offensive　power.　In　response,　the　attackers　can　allocate　its　offensive　resources　to　attack　the　system　and　defend　themselves　from　being　attacked　by　the　defenders.　In　this　research,　we　use　the　cumulative　prospect　value　instead　of　the　vulnerability　as　the　performance　measure　such　that　the　risk　attitudes　of　defenders　and　attackers　can　be　considered.　Further,　we　study　the　cooperative　behaviors　and　non-cooperative　behaviors　of　the　attackers　and　analyze　the　effect　on　the　optimal　resource　allocation.　Numerical　experiments　are　carried　out　to　illustrate　the　applications.　©　2021　Elsevier　Ltd