The　high-tech　industry　is　the　main　force　promoting　the　development　of　China＇s　national　economy.　As　its　industrial　economic　strength　grows,　China＇s　high-tech　industry　is　increasingly　using　cross-border　mergers　and　acquisitions　(CBM&A)　as　an　important　way　to　＂go　out.＂　To　explore　the　rules　governing　the　process　and　operation　mechanism　of　reverse　knowledge　transfer　(RKT)　through　the　CBM&A　of　China＇s　high-tech　industry　under　government　intervention,　a　tripartite　evolutionary　game　model　of　the　government,　the　parent　company,　and　the　subsidiary　as　the　main　subjects　is　constructed　in　this　paper.　The　strategies　adopted　by　the　three　subjects　in　the　RKT　game　process　are　analysed,　and　the　factors　influencing　RKT　through　CBM&A　under　government　intervention　are　simulated　and　analysed　using　Python　3.7　software.　The　results　show　that,　under　government　intervention,　the　parent　company　and　subsidiary　have　different　degrees　of　influence　on　each　other.　Subsidiaries　are　highly　sensitive　to　the　compensation　rate　of　RKT.　Positive　intervention　by　the　government　tends　to　foster　stable　cooperation　between　the　parent　company　and　the　subsidiary.　However,　over　time,　the　government　gradually　relaxes　its　intervention　in　the　RKT　and　innovation　of　multinational　companies.