This　paper　studies　an　information　provision　game　between　a　better-informed　government　(on　the　climate　change-related　disaster)　and　a　transport　facility　operator.　The　government　can　acquire　better　disaster　information　and　adopt　a　persuasion　strategy　to　affect　the　facility　operator＇s　adaptation　investment.　The　Bayesian　persuasion　framework　is　used　to　model　the　government＇s　design　on　its　information　signaling　mechanism.　We　also　solve　the　equilibrium　outcomes　of　government　subsidy　policy　and　benchmark　them　with　those　under　the　persuasion　strategy.　Our　analytical　results　suggest　that　the　government＇s　optimal　persuasion　strategy　depends　on　the　common　prior　belief　on　the　disaster　and　the　expected　level　of　unavoidable　loss　(NL).　When　the　NL　is　low　(or　intermediate,　respectively),　the　persuasion　strategy　should　be　full　(or　partial,　respectively)　disclosure　of　the　government＇s　information　to　the　facility　operator.　When　the　NL　is　high,　the　persuasion　strategy　has　no　impacts.　In　terms　of　social　welfare　improvement,　the　persuasion　strategy　dominates　(or　is　dominated　by,　respectively)　the　subsidy　policy　if　the　effectiveness　of　the　adaptation　investment　is　low　(or　high,　respectively).　When　the　effectiveness　of　the　adaptation　investment　is　intermediate,　the　comparison　is　uncertain.　Furthermore,　we　extend　our　model　to　the　oligopoly　case　with　multiple　competing　transport　facilities　and　also　allow　their　adaptation　investments　to　have　positive　externality.　We　find　that　more　intense　competition　among　the　facility　operators　leads　to　more　conservative　persuasion　strategy,　and　larger　spillover　effect　of　the　adaptation　investment　among　facilities　leads　to　more　radical　persuasion　strategy.