The　transformation　of　Chinese　coal　power　firms　is　crucial　for　achieving　carbon　emission　reduction　(CER)　goals,　and　promoting　green　technology　innovation　(GTI)　is　the　key　for　the　achievement.　To　examine　the　interactive　mechanism　of　central　and　local　government　regulatory　behavior　and　coal　power　firms＇　GTI　behavior　under　China＇s　dual-regulatory　system,　this　paper　introduces　environmental　impact　coefficients　and　develops　a　tripartite　evolutionary　game　model　(EGM)　from　the　perspective　of　CER.　The　influencing　factors　and　interactive　relationships　among　them　are　analyzed.　Additionally,　through　numerical　simulation,　the　impacts　of　changes　in　central　and　local　government　S&P　(subsidies　and　penalties)　on　the　evolution　of　the　system　are　also　obtained.　The　findings　indicate　the　following:　(1)　Enhancing　the　initial　willingness　can　accelerate　the　system＇s　attainment　of　an　optimal　state.　The　local　government　exhibits　a　slower　pace　of　evolution.　Coal　power　firms　are　more　sensitive　to　changes　in　the　initial　willingness　of　the　central　government.　(2)　The　local　government　is　more　sensitive　to　changes　in　the　central　government＇s　S&P　intensity　rather　than　changes　in　the　central　government＇s　initial　willingness.　Low　levels　of　central　government　S&P　and　high　penalties　are　ineffective,　while　high　subsidies　can　lead　to　a　sudden　decrease　in　the　local　government＇s　willingness.　(3)　Local　government　penalties　have　a　positive　correlation　with　their　effectiveness　in　promoting　GTI,　whereas　high　subsidies　are　ineffective.　(4)　The　separate　implementation　of　subsidies　or　penalties　by　either　the　central　or　the　local　government　is　detrimental　to　achieving　the　optimal　state.　Such　an　approach　renders　the　fluctuant　or　negative　behavior　of　the　local　government　and　coal　power　firms.