An analysis on queuing and queue-jumping of drivers at the intersection based on the evolutionary game - 文章详情页

作者：

Li, Zhen-Long (Li, Zhen-Long.) | Qian, Hai-Feng (Qian, Hai-Feng.) | Liu, Zhe (Liu, Zhe.)

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摘要：

Decision-making　model　of　queuing　and　queue-jumping　of　drivers　at　intersections　is　proposed　concerning　the　behavior　of　queue-jumping.　The　evolutionary　process　that　drivers　choose　strategies　of　queuing　and　queue-jumping　is　analyzed　using　evolutionary　game　theory.　A　duplicative　dynamic　equation　is　established　and　evolutionary　stable　state　is　analyzed.　The　results　show　that　the　payoff　of　queuing　drivers　is　larger　than　that　of　queue-jumping　drivers　when　the　queue-jumping　drivers　of　violating　regulations　can　be　timely　found　and　punished　by　the　traffic　management　department.　The　strategy　of　queuing　is　the　evolutionary　stable　state.

关键词：

Game theory Queueing theory Decision making Traffic control

作者机构：

[ 1 ] [Li, Zhen-Long]School of Electronic Information and Control Engineering, Beijing University of Technology, Beijing 100124, China
[ 2 ] [Qian, Hai-Feng]School of Electronic Information and Control Engineering, Beijing University of Technology, Beijing 100124, China
[ 3 ] [Liu, Zhe]School of Electronic Information and Control Engineering, Beijing University of Technology, Beijing 100124, China

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