A formal method based on noninterference for analyzing trust chain of trusted computing platform - 文章详情页

作者：

Zhang, Xing (Zhang, Xing.) | Huang, Qiang (Huang, Qiang.) | Shen, Chang-Xiang (Shen, Chang-Xiang.)

收录：

EI Scopus PKU CSCD

摘要：

The　integrity　measurement　of　TCG　can　only　insure　that　the　components　of　a　computing　platform　are　tamper-proofed,　which　is　not　enough　for　avoiding　the　interference　between　components　at　runtime　for　building　the　trust　chain.　The　interference　of　other　components　results　in　the　unexpected　information　flow.　The　trust　model　of　Trusted　Computing　Platform　is　analyzed　in　this　paper.　Based　on　the　intransitive　noninterference　model,　a　formal　method　of　analyzing　the　trust　chain　transfer　is　proposed.　It　formalized　specifies　the　security　policy　isolating　the　interference　between　components　that　can　make　the　trust　chain　valid　after　integrity　measurement.

关键词：

Formal methods Security systems Trusted computing

作者机构：

[ 1 ] [Zhang, Xing]Institute of Electronic Technology, Information Engineering University, Zhengzhou 450004, China
[ 2 ] [Zhang, Xing]College of Computer Science and Technology, Beijing University of Technology, Beijing 100022, China
[ 3 ] [Huang, Qiang]Computing Technology Institute of China Navy, Beijing 100036, China
[ 4 ] [Shen, Chang-Xiang]Institute of Electronic Technology, Information Engineering University, Zhengzhou 450004, China
[ 5 ] [Shen, Chang-Xiang]Computing Technology Institute of China Navy, Beijing 100036, China

通讯作者信息：

电子邮件地址：

zhangxing@bjut.edu.cn

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