Under　demand　uncertainty,　the　issue　of　how　to　use　buyback　contract　to　achieve　supply　chain　coordination　has　been　a　hot　topic　in　supply　chain　management.　In　a　two-echelon　supply　chain,　consists　of　a　single　supplier　and　a　single　retailer,　we　used　Stackelberg　game　method　to　study　the　buyback　contract　model　under　such　conditions　that　whether　the　retailer　made　sales　effort　or　not.　The　result　shows　that:　(1)　the　buyback　contract　model　in　which　the　retailer　does　not　make　sales　effort　can　achieve　supply　chain　coordination　when　the　shortage　cost　exists　and　the　supplier　does　not　provide　sales　incentives;　(2)　the　buyback　contract　model　in　which　the　retailer　makes　all　or　part　sales　effort　cannot　achieve　supply　chain　coordination　but　can　improve　the　profits　of　the　supply　chain　when　the　shortage　cost　exists　and　the　supplier　does　not　provide　sales　incentives;　(3)　the　buyback　contract　model　in　which　the　retailer　makes　all　sales　effort　can　achieve　supply　chain　coordination　when　the　supplier　provides　sales　incentives　to　the　retailer.　And　in　this　condition,　if　the　supplier　adjusts　the　wholesale　price,　when　the　wholesale　price　increases,　the　retailer＇s　profits　will　decrease　and　the　supplier＇s　profits　will　increase,　by　using　the　buyback　reward　contract,　the　model　can　achieve　the　supply　chain　coordination.　©　Springer-Verlag　Berlin　Heidelberg　2014.