Block　withholding　attack　is　an　action　where　a　miner　who　has　found　a　legal　block　chooses　not　to　submit　it　but　rather　directly　abandons　it.　This　attack　makes　the　mining　pool　lose　all　bitcoin　rewards　contained　within　the　block.　In　this　paper,　we　construct　a　generalized　model　where　two　participants　can　choose　to　either　cooperate　with　each　other　or　employ　a　block　withholding　attack　in　the　mining　pool.　To　make　the　model　more　realistic,　we　consider　both　the　cost　of　partial　proof　of　work　and　the　cost　of　cooperation.　We　also　calculate　the　reward-per-time　instead　of　profit-per-time　to　better　measure　the　payoffs　of　each　party.　Further,　we　discuss　the　case　where　the　payoff　function　and　cost　function　are　directly　related　to　the　computational　power.　The　pure　strategy　and　mixed　strategy　are　analyzed　respectively　and　the　segmentations　of　the　equilibrium　are　shown.　We　demonstrate　that　increasing　the　information　asymmetry　by　utilizing　information　conceal　mechanisms　could　lower　the　occurrence　of　the　BWH　attack.