Rational　player＇s　behavior　in　secret　sharing　schemes　always　determined　by　their　expect　payoff,　under　this　scenario,　they　have　not　incentive　to　send　secret　share,　this　rational　behavier　makes　secret　sharing　impossible.　In　order　to　force　rational　player　to　cooperate　for　achieving　successful　secret　sharing,　we　propose　a　new　rational　secret　sharing　scheme　based　on　repeated　game,　players　interact　repeatedly　in　several　rounds,　a　rational　player　may　be　deterred　from　exploiting　his　short　term　advantage　by　the　threat　of　Grim　Trigger　Strategy　(GTS)　that　reduces　his　long　term　payoff,　which　enables　the　possibility　of　secret　sharing　among　rational　players.　In　this　scheme,　the　secret　shadow　is　selected　by　the　player　himself　instead　of　being　distributed　by　the　dealer,　and　even　the　dealer　cannot　gain　the　player＇s　share.　After　analyzing,　our　scheme　has　higher　safety　and　effectiveness,　to　better　meet　the　application　requirements.　©　2011　IEEE.