Enterprises　and　governments　are　the　two　game　main　bodies.　Their　choice　of　game　strategies　is　a　process　of　dynamic　adjustment.　This　paper,　using　the　evolutionary　game　theory　as　a　tool,　establishes　the　innovative　evolutionary　game　model　to　analyze　the　strategy　choice　in　the　process　of　imitation　and　replication　by　game　main　bodies.　The　analytic　conclusion　tells　us　that　the　government＇s　improved　incentive　system　is　a　guarantee　for　the　enterprise　to　engage　in　technological　innovation.　On　the　other　hand,　the　enthusiasm　of　the　enterprise　for　technological　innovation　is　the　driver　for　the　governments　to　undertake　system　innovation.　In　addition,　the　evolutionary　equilibrium　of　game　is,　in　system　terms,　to　ensure　the　reduction　of　external　costs　of　the　enterprise　to　stimulate　it　to　engage　in　innovation,　while　the　enterprise　would　choose　to　the　continue　its　innovation　in　order　to　pursue　the　innovation　income.