During　agent　negotiation,　argumentation-based　negotiation　of　agent　has　been　widely　studied　for　it　can　make　agent　who　received　the　argument　change　its　goals　or　preferences　accordingly.　Being　the　two　main　arguments,　threat　and　reward　can　even　make　the　negotiators　reduce　their　behavior　space　to　find　a　well　compromise　quickly　in　the　end,　which　can　make　them　accomplish　their　cooperation　on　the　base　of　getting　the　most　profit　of　each　of　them.　This　paper　presents　a　type　of　formal　models　of　threat　and　reward　first,　and　then　present　a　new　way　of　how　to　calculate　the　negotiation　strengths　of　them　through　simulated　calculations　based　on　the　models　to　make　the　negotiators　threatened　or　rewarded　make　a　right　choice　and　accomplish　their　cooperation　well.　©　Springer-Verlag　Berlin　Heidelberg　2006.