Waste　cooking　oil　(WCO)　is　one　of　the　most　promising　feedstocks　for　biodiesel　production　as　it　is　environment　friendly,　has　energy　supply　potential,　impacts　edible　oil　safety,　and　enables　competitive　recycling　costs.　However,　one　central　roadblock　to　the　development　of　WCO-based　biodiesel　in　China　is　its　fairly　low　collection　rate　in　the　formal　WCO　supply　chain.　Most　waste　cooking　oil　is　still　collected　by　informal　collectors　with　some　flowing　back　to　“table.”　The　aim　of　our　paper　is　to　identify　the　most　effective　incentive　conditions　and　targets　in　the　WCO　supply　chain　to　offer　recommendations　that　address　this　WCO　roadblock.　Accordingly,　we　designed　a　Stackelberg　game　model　among　restaurants,　recyclers,　and　biodiesel　production　enterprises.　The　results　show　that　restaurants　are　the　best　targets　for　incentives　in　this　WCO　supply　chain.　With　a　certain　amount　of　monetary　incentives,　the　WCO　supply　for　biofuel　production　can　be　improved　significantly.　If　the　restaurant　subsidy　is　4000 yuan/ton,　the　amount　of　WCO　recycled　would　increase　by　47%,　which　is　far　more　efficient　than　incenting　recyclers　or　biofuel　producers.　We　also　set　up　four　scenarios　and　found　that　compared　with　a　single　policy　approach　(mandatory　only　or　economic　incentive　only),　a　combined　policy　(mandatory　with　economic　incentive)　would　be　the　most　effective　means　to　incent　restaurants　to　submit　WCO　for　biofuel.　There　was　also　a　correlation　between　policy　incentive　effectiveness　and　restaurant　sensitivity　to　WCO　submission　profits.　When　the　price　sensitivity　was　larger　than　17.98,　the　best　policy　for　the　government　would　be　to　offer　economic　incentives　to　restaurants.　To　guarantee　the　effectiveness　of　such　policy　incentives,　supporting　laws,　policy　guidelines,　and　routine　supervision　should　be　provided　as　well.　©　2019,　The　Joint　Center　on　Global　Change　and　Earth　System　Science　of　the　University　of　Maryland　and　Beijing　Normal　University.