Guarantees　by　suppliers　improve　the　credit　level　of　small　and　medium　enterprises　(SMEs),　make　it　easier　for　SMEs　to　solve　financing　problems,　and　also　increase　the　sales　of　their　own　products.　In　this　study,　several　credit　guarantee　contracts　were　added　to　the　inventory　pledge　financing　model.　We　then　established　a　Stackelberg　game　model　of　inventory　pledged　financing　that　is　part　of　the　credit　guarantee　contract.　The　optimal　decision-making　for　each　subject　under　this　model　was　obtained.　The　effect　of　varying　the　initial　pledge　volume　of　retailers　and　the　guarantee　factor　of　the　supplier　on　the　pledge　ratio　were　studied　for　different　bank　interest　rates.　In　addition,　different　guarantee　ratios　were　studied.　Our　results　show　that　when　only　considering　the　relationship　between　one　factor　and　the　pledge　ratio,　the　bank　pledge　ratio　increases　with　the　increase　of　the　proportion　of　suppliers＇　guarantee,　and　the　bank　pledge　ratio　decreases　as　the　initial　pledge　volume　of　retailers　increases.　Finally,　we　conducted　several　case　studies　to　confirm　our　findings.　Our　research　makes　a　valuable　contribution　to　improving　bank　and　supply　chain　party　decision-making.　©　2019,　Editorial　Board　of　Journal　of　Beijing　University　of　Chemical　Technology　(Natural　Science　Edition).　All　right　reserved.