Intellectual　property　cooperation　is　vital　to　integrating　innovation　resources,　improving　innovation　energy.　It　involves　many　factors　including　behavioral　agents　and　national　economy-macro-management　scenarios,　should　be　seriously　considered　by　multi-stakeholders　during　the　process　of　intellectual　property　cooperation.　Based　on　the　evolutionary　game　theory,　this　paper　analyzes　the　Government-Industry-University-Research　(GIUR)　intellectual　property　cooperation　behavior　and　its　influencing　factors　from　market　mechanism　and　administrative　supervision　mechanism.　Firstly,　the　newly　proposed　game　models　are　developed　to　observe　the　cooperation　behavior　which　can　be　realized　as　strategies　and　payoff　functions　of　the　multi-stakeholders,　then,　the　evolutionary　replication　dynamics　equations　are　formulated　to　study　evolutionarily　stable　strategies　of　multi-stakeholders.　Finally,　to　verify　the　theoretical　results,　simulation　experiments　are　conducted　with　meaningful　results:　under　the　market　mechanism,　the　reasonable　government　subsidy　incentive,　and　the　liquidated　damages　can　make　GIUR　practice　an　active　intellectual　property　cooperation　behavior　to　each　other;　under　the　administrative　supervision　mechanism,　reasonable　tax　rate　and　administrative　penalties　are　conducive　to　promoting　and　stabilizing　GIUR　intellectual　property　cooperation.　In　addition,　the　government　will　have　the　＂interest　appeal＂　to　maximize　additional　social　benefits　in　the　game　with　enterprises,　universities　or　research　institutes.　The　results　can　guide　GIUR　to　make　better　decisions　in　the　future.