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作者:

Han, Qiaoming (Han, Qiaoming.) | Du, Donglei (Du, Donglei.) | Xu, Dachuan (Xu, Dachuan.) (学者:徐大川) | Xu, Yicheng (Xu, Yicheng.)

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摘要:

The single-dipped domain can be used to model any allocation problem where a single output must be chosen in an interval with the assumption that agents' preferences have a single most loathful point (the dip) in the interval, and the preferences are increasing as one moves away from that dip. Practical domains like this appear in political voting system where each voter has his most-hated candidate and alternative candidates are evaluated by their proximity to this candidate or in obnoxious location problem, where each agent prefers to have the obnoxious location to be distant from his own location, among others. We first characterize deterministic and anonymous strategy-proof and group strategy-proof mechanisms on single-dipped public policy domain, complementing the well-known results on single-peaked policy domain first investigated by Moulin (Pub. Choice 35:437-455, 1980). Then we consider the tradeoff between strategy-proofness and efficiency by applying our characterization. As concrete applications of our results, we extend existing models and results, and resolve several open questions related to the obnoxious facility location game from the algorithmic mechanism design literature.

关键词:

Strategy-proof Mechanism design Anonymous Pareto-optimal Approximation algorithm efficiency

作者机构:

  • [ 1 ] [Han, Qiaoming]Zhejiang Univ Finance & Econ, Sch Data Sci, Hangzhou 310018, Zhejiang, Peoples R China
  • [ 2 ] [Du, Donglei]Univ New Brunswick, Fac Business Adm, Fredericton, NB E3B 5A3, Canada
  • [ 3 ] [Xu, Dachuan]Beijing Univ Technol, Dept Appl Math, 100 Pingleyuan, Beijing 100124, Peoples R China
  • [ 4 ] [Xu, Yicheng]Beijing Univ Technol, Dept Appl Math, 100 Pingleyuan, Beijing 100124, Peoples R China
  • [ 5 ] [Du, Donglei]Beijing Univ Technol, Beijing Inst Sci & Engn Comp, Beijing 100124, Peoples R China

通讯作者信息:

  • 徐大川

    [Xu, Dachuan]Beijing Univ Technol, Dept Appl Math, 100 Pingleyuan, Beijing 100124, Peoples R China

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来源 :

JOURNAL OF GLOBAL OPTIMIZATION

ISSN: 0925-5001

年份: 2018

期: 4

卷: 70

页码: 859-873

1 . 8 0 0

JCR@2022

ESI学科: ENGINEERING;

ESI高被引阀值:156

JCR分区:1

被引次数:

WoS核心集被引频次: 3

SCOPUS被引频次: 2

ESI高被引论文在榜: 0 展开所有

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